Abstract. Banks' lack of knowledge about the credit risk of potential borrowers constitutes an important friction in credit markets. If information problems are more severe in recessions, this might explain why the cyclicality of the credit supply. Alternatively, information problems may be reduced in recessions, if tough times reveal information about firm quality. We test these contrasting views of information frictions in the credit market using detailed data on lending from a large bank. We find that this banks' ability to sort borrowers by credit quality is best in recessions, and worst in good times. This suggests that information frictions are counter-cyclical in corporate credit markets.
borrowers are worse in booms. Banks may be better able to sort firms on credit risk in bad periods because they try harder, reflecting counter-cyclical incentives to screen (Ruckes 2004) .
Alternatively, loan officer skills may deteriorate in booms, reducing the quality of bank credit decisions (Berger Udell 2004) . Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006) develop a model where booms are characterized by a reduced need to screen new borrowers. Finally, credit officers may exert more effort because they are more risk averse (Cohn, Engelmann, Fehr, Maréchal 2015) .
However, another set of models involves information frictions that are more severe in bad times. For example, Kurlat (2013) models an economy where lower investment opportunities increase AI problems, which generates a feedback to growth. Both Ordonez (2013) and Guerrieri and Shimer (2014) also model economies where worsening AI is the driver of cyclical downturns.
Thus, there are several arguments consistent with both pro-and counter-cyclical information frictions in credit markets. Prior evidence is mostly indirect. For example, Dilly and Mählmann (2015) document that initial credit ratings of corporate bonds issued in recessions are more accurate than those initial ratings issued in better times, consistent with lower information frictions in bad periods. 3 Can credit flow data help settle the question? Financing with bank loans is likely more reliant on overcoming asymmetric information than financing with bonds.
Indeed, bank lending is more cyclical than arm's-length credit (Kashyap Stein Wilcox 1993; Becker Ivashina 2014 . This pattern could reflect cyclical variation in information frictions, but is also consistent with other factors holding back bank lending (as in Holmström Tirole 1997) .
In this paper, we attempt a more direct examination of the quality of bank information about borrowers. We use data from a large Swedish bank to test whether the bank's assessments of credit quality of its corporate clients is cyclical. The data provides detailed information on the bank's corporate loans and borrowers through two business cycles. Our main tests examine whether the banks' internal metrics of credit quality perform better or worse in bad times.
The bank employs an internal rating system that assesses the credit quality of borrowers, using an ordinal scale. We compare the precision in these internal ratings over time by regressing a measure of loan defaults (or borrower bankruptcy) on the bank's past internal ratings for borrowers. This method faces an econometric challenge in that borrowers with better ratings are more likely to be granted more credit (or be charged less interest or otherwise be offered better terms), and these credit decisions can affect future default risk, possibly in different ways over the cycle. 4 Therefore, we need to separate the predictive power of ratings (holding credit offered constant) from the effect of credit decisions (which rely on the ratings) on future credit quality.
We try to address this challenge by controlling for the amount of credit a firm is granted. In other words, for two similar borrowers, with the same amount of credit outstanding, is the one with a better internal rating less likely to default? In our sample, the answer is yes. We find a strong negative correlation between the predictive power of ratings and macro-economic performance (GDP growth, stock market index, consumer confidence index). This applies both to the magnitudes of coefficient estimates and to measures of explanatory power such as Rsquared. Thus, this bank is best able to predict default in business cycle downturns, a pattern consistent with information frictions being pro-cyclical, i.e. weaker in recessions. 5 We address several alternative explanations of the results or potential problems with our interpretation of the results. One concern is whether banks' internal ratings really matter to decision making. Perhaps the bank's decisions are based on different metrics, or some soft information to which we lack access. If so, real lending decisions may exhibit cyclicality that differs from what we document for internal ratings. We address this by also studying the 4 The impact of new credit on default risk may be complicated. In the short run, the likelihood of default risk is almost certainly lower after new credit, but in the long run, the firm has more leverage and may therefore be more likely to default. This "term structure" of default risk may vary across firms, industries and the business cycle. See for example Glennon and Nigro (2005) . 5 Default is defined as missed payments (interest or amortization) by at least 60 days. See empirical section.
amount of credit the bank has decided to grant, but has not yet offered, a borrower. We call this "credit slack" and use it as an alternative measure of the bank's assessment of a borrower.
Credit slack reflects new credit the loan officer responsible for the firm could grant without consulting the next hierarchical level in the bank's commercial credit organization (a manager or a credit committee). Thus, from the point of view of the bank, this a credit decision (since the loan officer may grant the credit), but it is not known to -or reflected in any financial flow tothe borrower. We show that "slack" predicts defaults: of two firms with the same amount of credit, the one with lower slack is more likely to default. As for internal ratings, the predictive power of credit slack is strongest in bad times. This reinforces the conclusion that information frictions are most severe in good times.
We also consider whether the mix of borrowers is more challenging in good times, e.g., because
there are more new entrants in the pool of rated borrowers (this prediction is made by Dell'Arriccia and Marquez 2006). However, such compositional shifts do not drive our results, which hold for new and old borrowers separately. Similarly, the variation in industry composition does not appear to explain the time-series patterns we observe.
A relevant question to ask is whether our results could reflect higher monitoring and screening efforts by the bank, in a more difficult information environment, as predicted by Rucker (2004)?
We test this using data on when the banks revises borrower ratings. Such monitoring activity is highly seasonal, but not cyclical. Thus, we see no sign that increased monitoring efforts in recessions are driving the greater precision the bank's risk assessments. This result suggests that it is the environment itself, rather than the bank's actions, that lessens the extent of information frictions in recessions.
Overall, our results are consistent with the literature that sees information frictions in credit markets as key to credit markets. However, the information problem we study appears most severe in good times. Thus, broadly speaking, our findings do not fit the theories where information frictions in credit markets play a role in recessions, but is more consistent with models of poor lending decisions in booms. 6 Asymmetric information may also have different cyclical properties in different parts of the financial system. For example, asset markets and the market for bank equity may experience wider asymmetries in crises than corporate credit markets do. Given the key role of corporate credit markets for funding investment, the results presented here are nevertheless of great potential importance.
Our paper is also related to the broader literature on why credit markets are cyclical, extending beyond the role of information frictions. One such explanation of credit markets' cyclicality involves the role of financial institutions themselves: low loan supply in recessions may reflect the impairment or weakness of the financial institutions that intermediate loans (Holmström and Tirole 1997) or incentive problems facing bank managers (Rajan 1992 , Myerson 2012 . 7 A second category of explanations involves agency problems between lenders and borrowers.
Such agency problems can become more severe in recessions if corporate losses reduce equity value (Bernanke and Gertler 1989) or if asset values fall (Kiyotaki Moore 1997) . Our results, by limiting the set of candidate explanations for credit cycles, provide indirect support for (at least some of) these mechanisms.
Data and variables
For our analysis, we use a comprehensive database of all corporate accounts of one of the major Swedish commercial banks (henceforth, "the bank"). The database contains all loan files the bank maintains for each borrower at a monthly frequency between 2004:01 and 2012:12. As our main unit of analysis, we use borrowers rather than individual loans, following the bank's own view that credit risk is mainly a firm-level issue. The bank therefore assesses borrower risk with its internal ratings system).
We supplement the bank's data with annual accounting information from Statistics Sweden and information from UC AB, the Swedish leading credit bureau, which is jointly owned by the largest Swedish banks. The credit bureau data includes the firms' payment histories and the credit bureau's assessment of the firms' credit risk as captured by their credit score and an ordinal rating. 8 Table 1 lists the variables used in this study and Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics for each variable for the entire sample: The mean, median, standard deviation, and number of observations. We analyze two sets of variables that pertain to the bank´s evaluation of their borrowers' riskiness and the bank's monitoring activity, respectively.
Borrower and loan data
In Table 3 , we report data for firms with different internal ratings (IR). IR is the bank's own measure of the borrower's creditworthiness and uses seven main categories, with sub-grades of plus and minus. We code this variable from one to 21, where one is the worst rating (highest default risk) and 12 is the best (lowest default risk). The credit risk model used by the bank is based on multiple data sources including credit ratings from a credit bureau, borrower income statements, balance sheet information and other (soft) information (Nakamura and Roszbach 2010) . Only borrowers to which the bank has a total exposure above a certain pre-determined threshold are assigned an internal rating. In our raw data, 70-80% of firms are assigned an IR each year, representing that vast majority of loans outstanding. IR values are stable over time:
on average, 2% of firms change category from one quarter to next.
Our key outcome measure is the occurrence of a borrower default within a period of 12 or 24 months. The default variable is equal to one when any payment is over 90 days past due.
Because defaults are sometimes resolved quickly and at a limited loss for the bank, we also use bankruptcy filings as an alternative dependent variable. Bankruptcy is somewhat rarer but typically more severe and more likely to be a terminal state than default is. In our data bankruptcies constitute a subset of default events (58% of default events are also bankruptcies in our sample).
We report the average default and bankruptcy rate and loss given default by IR category in Table 3 . The 12 and 24 month default and bankruptcy rate is by far the highest for rating category 1, and losses given default are on average highest for the worst IR as well. Despite this, more of the bank's credit losses are caused by firms with a better rating a year before their default. Thus, in an aggregate sense, the default risk of relatively safe firms is key to understanding the precision of the bank's information. Panel B of the table also provides data on the number of loans per firms, the share of loans that have some collateral, the average loan maturity and the average interest rate for each IR category. Table 3 illustrates how default rates rise monotonically and in a convex fashion with falling rating categories. Using rating categories linearly in regressions may therefore be inefficient. On the other hand, allowing a completely flexible form (e.g., through separate dummy variables for each category) would complicated interpreting whether ratings are better or worse at predicting default. To both allow easy interpretation and a non-linear relationship between ratings and default rates, we estimate a 4 th degree polynomial in IR (with only time FE), to generate a default prediction that fits (12 month) default rates. We call this variable "IR polynomial". 9
As an alternative to IR, we use a second measure of the borrowers' creditworthiness, "credit slack", defined as the amount of credit the loan officer is allowed to extend without further internal approval. This amount is not communicated to the firm. We define this second 
where the Internal Limit is the maximum amount the loan officer is entitled to lend to the firm.
The Internal Limit is based on the repayment ability of the firm, and changes in this limit must be are approved by a senior official or a credit committee, depending on the size of the loan.
Monitoring
We construct different measures of the bank's monitoring activity. These measures are based on the frequency with which the bank reviews a borrower´s files and possibly revises either the client's credit rating or credit limit, reassesses collateral values, or makes other changes to the client's credit terms. By internal rules, loan officers are expected to review each client's file at least once every 12 months. The average time between two monitoring events is slightly above 10 months and it varies from 1 to 24 months. Long time gaps are rare: only 2.1% of firm-months are beyond the expected 12 month limit since their last reported monitoring.
Macro data
We use two variables to capture the evolution of the macro economy: the seasonally adjusted, real GDP growth (measured at quarterly frequency) and a stock market index return over the last 12 months (which we measure at the end of each month). We use the OMX30, a market value-weighted price index of the 30 most actively traded stocks on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. The two time series variables are correlated with each other (0.73) and also with consumer confidence measures of the business cycle (0.70 and 0.51 for GDP growth and stock market return, respectively). We define a recession dummy as equal to one when at least one of the trailing 12 month stock return and the real GDP growth is negative. 
Empirical results
In this section, we test the competing hypotheses regarding the cyclical properties of banks' internal credit ratings, which summarize the information they have available on their borrowers.
The relationships between internal ratings, slack and default
We start by documenting the basic relationship between the bank's two measures of creditworthiness and borrowers' likelihood of default. To assess the precision of the bank's information, we use probit regressions. The advantage of probit models (or similar models, such as logit), over a linear probability model is that they can better fit very low probabilities (recall that defaults and bankruptcy is rare for firms in many ratings categories). We estimate Probit regressions as follows:
We estimate (2) for defaults within twelve or twenty four months ( = 12 or = 24). 10 Control variables capturing accounting based measures of firm performance as well as the firm's credit bureau score. Results for both horizons, and with and without controls, are reported in Table 4 , with three panels for three different credit variables. In all specifications, the bank's information variables are significant and have the expected, negative sign (i.e., better quality borrowers have lower default probability).
In Panel A, the credit variable is IR. In columns one and four, we leave out all controls except for time fixed effects. These regressions help us answer if IR, on its own, predicts default. We find that it indeed does. We include control variable sin column two and five, to verify whether slack has predictive power for borrower default over and above the hard information captured in historic accounting data, payment remarks and the credit bureau's credit scores. This is close to asking whether IR reflects soft information that loan officers have (information not captured in the control variables). The credit variable (IR) again predicts default, and with a highly statistically significant coefficient. The estimated marginal effect of IR, evaluated at the mean of the dependent variable (i.e., around 1.5% default risk), implies that a three-unit increase in slack (the standard deviation is 3.6) reduces the likelihood of default from 1.50% to 1.19%, or a 21% drop in the likelihood of default.
In panel B, we repeat the tests using a fourth degree polynomial in IR (details are in the data section above). The magnitude of the estimated coefficient on IR polynomial is significantly different from zero with and without control variables. A one standard deviation increase in IR around the median IR (13) is associated with a 6% reduction of the default likelihood (from 1.50% to 1.42%). Because of the shape of the IR polynomial, the effect is much larger for higher risk firms. Dropping from the second worst to the worst IR group (from IR=5 to IR=2), while holding all control variables fixed, is associated with a 75% increase in default probability (from 12% to 21% risk of default), from the third worst to the second worst IR group (i.e., from IR=8 to IR=5) is associated with an increase of 47% (from 4.4% to 6.5%), and from the fourth worst to the third worst IR group (i.e., from IR=11 to IR=8) is associated with an increase of 22% (from 1.86% to 2.27%). 11
Finally, in Panel C, we use slack as the credit variable. Higher slack is significantly associated with lower default rates. The magnitude is slightly smaller than for the IR variables. For example, a one standard deviation increase in slack is associated with a 9% relative reduction in the 12 month default risk (evaluated around the unconditional mean of 1.5%).
The results in Table 4 show that both slack and IR are economically and statistically significant predictors of default, with and without controlling for hard information such as accounting data. The connection between future defaults and the bank's assessments of its borrowers suggest (a) that the bank has some ability to predict defaults and (b) that both IR and slack capture meaningful parts of the bank's internal information. Additionally, since we control for a fairly large set of accounting-based variables and the credit bureaus score, the residual effect of IR and slack can reasonably be considered "soft" information in the sense of Berger at al (2005) .
Information over the business cycle
In this sub-section we turn to the cyclical patterns in informational asymmetries that are our primary object of interest. Our main tests investigate the time-series variation in the informativeness of slack and IR. We first use several different non-parametric and graphical techniques to visually assess the informativeness of the two bank variables, and then turn to regression-based estimation of the time-series properties of AI.
Predictive accuracy of the internal ratings
To measure the predictive performance of the IR variable, we first use Moody's (2003) concept of 'accuracy curves'. An accuracy curve is a plot of the proportion of defaults accounted for by firms below a certain rating (y-axis) against the proportion of the firm population that are below the same rating (x-axis). An accurate rating system is one where most defaults occur for firms with low ratings and few defaults for firms with high ratings. This means the accuracy curve is close to the upper left corner. Random assignment of ratings (i.e. uninformative ratings)
produces an accuracy curve along the 45 degree line (as defaults are equally likely at all ratings levels). We construct accuracy curves for ratings at year end for all years, with a 12 month forward default horizon, and plot these annual curves in Figure 2 . Clearly, ratings contain a lot of predictive power in. Additionally, the recession years 2008, 2009 and 2011 which contain negative growth quarters, have three of the four highest accuracy ratios. This could be interpreted as evidence that the banks' information is more precise in bad times. Considering our quarterly data at annual frequencies disregards a lot of the variation in accuracy rates. Our visual comparison does not work well when showing too many curves at once. Therefore, we next consider a way of plotting precision over time.
Survival rates by rating over time
Our sample of firms is largely stable over time, although some firms do drop out of the panel.
To deal with possible bias caused by selection on disappearance, we use Kaplan-Meier survival rates to examine the fine time-series variation in default rates across the various internal ratings.
The Kaplan-Meier estimator is a nonparametric estimate of the survival function S(t) (and the corresponding hazard function), using the empirical estimator Ŝ(t): Comparing vertical distances between lines in Figure 3 corresponds to measuring differences in default risk. Once concern is that if default rates double, absolute differences may mechanically increase, even if the sorting of risks did not improve in a relative sense. To address this, it can be helpful to examine ratios instead of differences. Next, we operationalize the idea of comparing relative default rates across categories.
Relative default risk
We now turn to an explicit comparison of relative defaults rates of different ratings over time.
To facilitate the comparison, we combine ratings into two categories, one group consisting of 12 Firms can exit the data without a default event when they repay their loans (for example because the firm changes bank).
the three highest ratings and another containing the next three grades. We drop the lowest category where default is imminent for most firms; results are qualitatively unchanged with this category included. The two groups are of comparable size. 13 We define the default ratio as the default frequency for the weak group divided by the default frequency for the overall sample as follows:
Here D measures the number of defaults and the number of firms at risk in group i, and strong and weak are labels for the two groups. This default ratio has several attractive properties as a measure of the precision of the bank's sorting of its borrowers. First, if the ratings are uninformative, the default frequency will be the same for the two ratings categories, and the default ratio becomes one. Thus, a lower bound for the ratio is one. 14 If all defaults occur in the weaker category ( = 0), the best possible outcome, the ratio simplifies to
i.e. the ratio of sample size. Since we have constructed the two groups' size to be of very similar size, this ratio is close to two in our data. Taken together, this means that the ratio has a natural scale from one (no information) to two (very good information).
We plot the quarter by quarter default ratio in Figure 4 , dropping IR category 7. 15 The average default ratio in expansions is 1.42 and in recessions 1.60. Based on the time series standard deviation of the ratio, the difference of 0.18 is significantly different from zero (t-stat of 7.30). 16 In other words, defaults are more concentrated among firms to which the bank assigned poor 13 We have also varied the methodology by using finer categories based on qualifiers to internal ratings ("pluses" and "minuses") and letting the cutoff vary by quarter, in order to make sure that the two groups are of equal size. We have also used Kaplan-Meier adjusted default rates. Results are very similar. 14 In a perverse scenario where defaults are less frequent for weak than for strong, the ratio is smaller than one. However, it would then make sense to switch the labels of the categories, and the ratio would not be below one. 15 Firms with IR = 7 are often already in default, and are perhaps not really a prediction challenge. Results are similar with these firms. 16 The t-stat using Newey-West standard errors which allow for four auto-correlation terms is 5.0.
ratings during a recession than in good times. This result confirms that the bank's ability to assess credit risk appears strongly countercyclical.
The high precision of the bank's ratings might reflect hard and soft information, since the assignment of firms to ratings uses on both types of information. We therefore plot the Default ratio based only on sorting the credit score, which in principle is data available to any bank (and thus, a hard signal). The precision of this hard variable is also counter-cyclical. One interpretation of this is that the problem of predicting defaults is inherently easier in recessions, as even a mechanical procedure of sorting firms does better in bad times. Additionally, it appears that the performance of IR is better than performance using only credit scores. The overall average Default ratio is 1.47 for the IR-based sort and 1.22 for the sort based on credit scores only. The difference (0.247) is significantly different from zero (assuming time series independence, the t-stat is 12.9, and allowing for four auto correlation terms, the t-stat is 8.7).
There are two important caveats to using the relative default ratio. First, this methodology penalizes defaults among highly rated firms (as captured by > 0), but pays no attention to non-defaults among poorly rated firms. These errors can be loosely compared to type 1 and 2 errors in statistics. The choice of ignoring missed non-defaults and focusing on missed defaults is sensible if missed defaults are much more costly. In credit decisions, this may be a fair assumption. Second, there are no control variables in this test. Next, we turn to regression specifications which deal with both these concerns (by allow control variables, and by implicitly looking at both types of mistakes).
Semi-parametric estimates of cyclicality
We now turn to regression-based estimates with many control variables. By filtering out information captured in these variables, we implicitly focus on the softer component of the bank's information (all the accounting based ratios are more or less hard information, and the credit score is hard, as well). To track time-series variation in the predictive precision of IR and slack, we adjust regression (2) by allowing the coefficients on bank's information (slack and IR)
to be different each quarter. This is a semi-parametric approach, in that we impose no structure on the time pattern of coefficients. We plot the quarterly coefficient estimates in Figure An additional measure of the ability of internal ratings to explain defaults is provided by Rsquared. If the information contained in IR is more useful for predicting defaults in recessions, the R-squared should be higher. To examine this, we estimate monthly regressions in recession and non-recession periods. To simplify the setting, we focus on the contributions of the credit score and the internal rating (results are qualitatively similar with more controls). The credit score corresponds closest to the standard notion of hard information, since it is a numerical variable, publicly available (for a fee). On the other hand, the internal rating incorporates both hard information and the bank's own soft information. We report the average R-squared (for OLS regressions) and Pseudo R-squared (for probit regressions) in Table 5 . Unlike the OLS statistic R-squared, the Pseudo R-squared cannot be interpreted as the share of variation explained by explanatory variables in the regression, but, on the other hand, we use Probit regressions for our tests. Thus we report both. The first row of Table 5 shows that the R-squared from internal ratings is several times higher in recessions than outside of recessions: 11% vs.
1.3%. 17 The model fit is also considerably better using the Pseudo R-squared: 23% in recessions vs 5% outside recessions. Credit scores also generate higher explanatory power in recessions, but the difference is small. Finally, we look at the marginal addition to explanatory power that internal ratings offer above credit scores, i.e. the difference in R-squared between a model with credit scores alone and one that also includes internal ratings. Here as well, the bank's information appears more important in recessions.
Parametric estimates of cyclicality
We next turn to a test of whether the cyclicality of bank information precision is related to business cycle variables in the sense of having a higher regression coefficient. To do this, we Results are reported in Table 6 . 18 The table confirms that the differences in patterns between good times and bad times shown in Figure 4 are statistically significant. The magnitudes of the interaction estimates are economically meaningful. In column 1, the coefficient on IR is estimated to be -0.071 in normal times, but -0.096 in recessions. This implies, for example, that a drop of three IR steps (i.e., one IR group) corresponds to a 24% increase in default risk in good times but a 32% increase in a recession (taking into account that the baseline risk is higher in recessions).
Similarly, there is a large estimated difference between recessions and other times in the impact of the other credit variables and default risk. These results imply that the bank's is best at predicting defaults in recessions, as suggested by Figure 5 . Next, we present robustness tests intended to distinguish between possible alternative explanations consistent with these cyclical patterns.
Robustness tests
In this section, we address a number of possible criticisms and questions about our main results.
First, we rule out that our results reflect the mechanical impact of higher credit flows for better rated borrowers on short run default risk. Second, we try to compare two channels that may produce better information for the bank: either the difficulty of assessing borrowers rises in booms and falls in recessions, and or the bank is trying harder to figure out credit quality (for example by adjusting monitoring frequency). Finally, we consider whether variation in the borrower pool may make it easier to assess borrowers in bad times (fewer borrowers with short credit histories).
New credit
We first consider a possible mechanical problem with our results. Firms with better slack and IR may less likely to default because they obtain more credit from the bank. In the short run, new credit almost surely reduces the default probability (the long run impact is ambiguous, since the additional credit will have to be repaid, increasing the amount of future commitments on which default is possible). This mechanism provide an alternative interpretation of our results, under which the precision of the bank's information might not vary over the cycle. By including controls for the level of credit from the bank, as well as the debt from all other sources, we have attempted to control for this in our baseline specifications. However, the default variable looks 12 or 24 months ahead (depending on the regression). Current IR and slack could predict new loans during this period. A simple way to test whether this is important is to drop any firm receiving new credit in the next 12 or 24 months. Results for this subset are presented in Table   7 . 19 The coefficients are statistically indistinguishable from those in the main specification (Table   6 ).
We conclude that the effects we capture do not appear to be mediated by new credit flows, and that variation in the predictive power of slack and IR indeed are likely reflecting variation in the banks' ability to assess credit risk. We next turn to alternative mechanisms that may drive variation in the precision of bank credit assessments.
Screening frequency
Is it possible that the bank exerts more effort in bad times, and so produces a better signal, even if the information environment does not make it easier to distinguish between borrowers?
Typical models of bank lending focus on the precision of banks' information, not how hard that information is to come by. Ruckes (2004) predicts that screening of borrowers is less important in good times, and we thus expect lower precision in those times. The only measure in our data that is related to screening intensity is the frequency with which the bank reevaluates the internal rating of each borrower. 20
In Figure 6 , where we plot the fraction of firms being subject to an evaluation by quarter. There is pronounced seasonality in this frequency, with a large peak in the fourth quarter of each year.
This seasonality appears to increase over time, so that more and more of the banks evaluations are done at the end of the year. Importantly, for our purposes, there appears to be no time pattern in total rate of assessments by year. The increasing activity in the last quarter of each year is offset by reduced activity in the other three quarters. Thus, we cannot detect differences in monitoring frequency for different business cycle states. This is not strong evidence against cyclical variation in screening intensity, however. The bank may increase intensity of screening (and monitoring) while the number of evaluations is fixed, by, for example, hiring more officers, hiring better officers, or providing stronger incentives. However, the fixed frequency suggests that the bank's improved ability to detect risk in recessions is not mechanically driven by reassessing borrowers more often. 21 20 Note that this information on monitoring frequency cannot help detect if loan officer skills deteriorate in booms, as Berger Udell (2004) predict, or if credit officers work harder each time they evaluate a borrower --for example, because they are more risk averse as in Cohn, Engelmann, Fehr, Maréchal (2015) . 21 As an additional robustness test (not reported), we have estimated our regressions using only fourth quarter observations or only observations with fresh reviews. Fourth quarter results are very similar to those for the full sample.
New borrowers
The default risk of a new borrower may be more difficult for the bank to assess than the risk of existing borrowers, where there is a longer history of interaction and business. If banks get more new borrowers in good times, the average precision of credit quality signals will be worse as the composition of borrowers becomes less favorable (Dell'Arriccia and Marquez 2006).
Potentially, this means that changes in the borrower pool could be a key mechanism behind our results. The presence of some cyclicality is thus apparent, but perhaps not enough that it could plausibly explain our large differences in precision through the cycle.
Nevertheless, we re-estimate regressions for existing clients only. Results are reported in Table   8 . The cyclicality patterns are similar to those for the full sample. The bank is better able predicting default among existing borrowers in recessions. Thus, we can conclude that the patterns we observe are not an artifact of time-variation in the mix of old and new bank clients. 22 We conclude that the Dell'Arriccia and Marquez (2006) mechanism does not appear quantitatively important in our sample. A related mechanism might involve other changes in the borrower pool making it harder to measure credit risk during recessions. We next turn to firm age and industry.
Borrower size and industry 22 We have also estimated results for new borrowers only. The sample is smaller, and significance slightly reduced. Coefficient estimates are similar.
So far, we have not considered the sample industry and size composition. In particular, small firms may be less well understood by the bank: they have less detailed accounting data and spending resources on assessing their performance and prospects is worth less to the bank.
Small firms make up a large share of our sample, and if their share is time varying, it is possible that they affect the bank's precision in booms and recessions. We test this issue by estimating our regressions separately for small and large firms. In particular, we would like to test whether our results exist for larger firms, which are individually more important. In Table 9 , we report regression results (similar to Table 6 ) for firms with 10 employees and up. These firms represent most of the credit volume in our sample but make up less than half of all firms. The results
show that coefficients are similar in magnitude, but are less precisely estimated compared to those for the full sample. The result for slack is insignificant.
We have also estimated regressions (not reported) separately for seven broad industry groups (retail, hotel/restaurant, transportation/communication, financial services, health services, social and personal services). Except for financial services, where there are very few borrowers, the cyclicality results are present in each industry.
We conclude that compositional effects probably are not the important mechanism(s) behind our cyclicality results.
Conclusions
The supply of corporate bank loans is highly pro-cyclical. Could this be because information frictions between lenders and borrowers are worse in recessions? Indeed, assessing borrowers' creditworthiness is a key challenge facing all lenders. Could the scope of this challenge be cyclical, contributing to low credit volumes in recessions? Our empirical results suggest that this information explanation of cyclicality appears not to be supported by the data. We study the loan portfolio of a large cross-border Swedish bank and find the opposite: corporate borrower defaults are in fact easiest to predict in recessions.
Our results suggest that this cyclical pattern does not reflect the composition of borrowers, e.g., the arrival of new, unknown firms. We also rule out that our results are contaminated by the extension of new loans. Instead, we show that that the cyclical patterns reflect the information environment.
To what extent can our results, from a sample based on a single Swedish bank during a specific period be extrapolated? One limitation is that this is a large bank, and small banks may use different lending technologies with different cyclical properties, or focus on different borrower sizes. However, the cyclical patterns we document do not appear sensitive to firm size or industry, suggesting that they may apply broadly. A working hypothesis is that the pattern we find is general to corporate lending.
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Figure 4. Default rates across ratings categories
The figure shows the relative default rates for firms of high and low credit quality. The black line represents the 12 month default rate for the top half of firms, based on the bank's internal rating categories, relative to the overall default rate (the lowest ratings category is excluded). The dashed, red line shows similar results using only credit bureau scores to sort firms. Shaded areas indicate recession periods (either trailing 12 month stock return is negative or nominal GDP growth is negative, or both). The dotted lines represent averages for recessions and expansions, respectively. Columns (1) and (2) present the average R squared for the linear probability models; columns (3) and (4) McFadden's Pseudo R-squared for probit models (one minus the ratio of the log likelihood with no control variables to the log likelihood with controls). The last row reports the marginal increase in R-squared and Pseudo R-squared due to IR, i.e. the difference between the row labeled "Credit Score and IR" and the row labeled "Credit Score". 
